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The African elephant (Laxadonta africana) declined from 1.2 million to 600,000 
animals during the 1980s. It was listed in 1989 under Appendix I of CITES, thereby banning 
legal trade in ivory. The ivory trade ban remains controversial. Critics allege that it makes 
elephant conservation a less attractive activity, inadvertently promoting conversion of elephant 
habitat to other uses. By reducing or eliminating revenues from elephant management and 
exploitation, the ban undermines incentives to enforce property rights to elephants (and habitat) 
and manage stocks sustainably. Supporters of a trade ban argue that enforcing property rights 
and sustainable harvests is difficult in semi-open access habitats, and that legal trade facilitates 
the laundering of illegal ivory products and killing of elephants.   
Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana, Malawi and South Africa have generally opposed the 
trade ban. In June 1997, CITES permitted Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe to sell 50 tons of 
stockpiled ivory on a one-time basis. In 2002, another one-off sale by Botswana, Namibia and 
South Africa was approved, but it took a July 2007 agreement before the sale was permitted; 
the agreement obliged countries to use the funds exclusively for elephant conservation and 
community development in areas within or adjacent to elephant range. Ivory was sold to 
Japanese and Chinese traders, and audited by CITES. Here is a summary of the auctions:     3
Date  Country of Sale  Amount ( kg) Value ($ US) Average ($/kg) 
1999 unspecified  50,000 5,150,000 103 
28-Oct-2008 Namibia  7,226 1,186,260 164 
31-Oct-2008 Botswana  43,153 7,093,550 164 
1-Nov-2008 Zimbabwe  3,700 500,000 135 
6-Nov-2008 South  Africa  47,356 6,703,000 142 
 
Two questions arise: Is an ivory trade ban effective in protecting elephants? Do 
‘one-off’ sales of ivory reverse the benefits of a trade ban by removing the stigma associated 
with purchasing ivory and facilitating illegal trade? Data are insufficient to provide definitive 
answers to these questions. Bulte and van Kooten (1996) use a theoretical model to argue that 
free trade is effective only if real rates of interest are low, which is not the case for most African 
range states. Bulte, van Kooten and Swanson (2003) demonstrate that weak institutions, lack of 
property rights, and general absence of rule of law militate against the use of market 
instruments to protect elephants. With respect to the role of one-off sales, Bulte, Damania and 
van Kooten (2006) use (admittedly poor) data on confiscations of ivory at borders and in range 
states to show that the 1999 sale did not increase illegal activity.   
Finally, van Kooten (2008) combined an elephant population growth model with an 
economic trade model to examine the consequences of an ivory trade ban and one-off sales of 
ivory. The model included four separate elephant producing regions in Africa (and one global 
buying region), and took into account illegal poaching of elephants and stockpiling of ivory by 
some range state governments. Also taken into consideration was the stigma associated with   4
purchasing banned ivory (demand for ivory shifted inwards when trade was banned) and the 
increased costs to poachers of marketing ivory when trade was banned. The bioeconomic 
model was parameterized using data on elephant populations, ivory carvers, ivory prices, and 
poaching and enforcement activities.   
Scenario analysis indicated that, regardless of whether there was an ivory trade ban, 
elephant numbers would decline and, in western and central Africa, might disappear entirely. 
The model also demonstrates that financial incentives based on the numbers of elephants 
protected will avert further erosion of elephant herds. Transfer payments from those interested 
in protecting elephants must necessarily be paid to those who are able to protect elephants, 
meaning landowners, subsistence farmers or rural communities more broadly. It does not matter 
whether the financial incentive is the result of transfer payments from those in rich countries or 
a result of linking elephants to the benefits from tourists, or some combination, although 
steady-state populations are greatest when payments are constant per elephant. In the absence 
of incentives, elephants will continue to be poached, regardless of whether ivory trade is 
banned or not. 
In conclusion, a trade ban might not be successful in maintaining elephant herds, even if 
it increases the costs of marketing ivory and leads to a stigma effect that reduces demand. 
Indeed, trade in elephant products may offer some hope for the elephant, but only if there exist 
effective institutions that translate in situ protection into economic values. The problem is that   5
the elephant is similar to the bison that once roamed the Great Plains of North America. It was 
doomed primarily because the land was much more valuable in cattle than bison production. 
Likewise, elephant range in Africa is often a less valuable use of land than agriculture. Land in 
elephant habitat must somehow become more competitive if elephant populations are not about 
to decline in the future. 
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